Category Archives: Company Law

Unpicking Shareholder Primacy

The idea that companies, if not all economic activity, exists to maximise the wealth of shareholders or owners, dominates the world of corporate governance and much else. Bankers and traders believe it. Industrial managers have been led to accept it. Universities and business schools preach it. It is part of the free market ideology, often identified by its origins, as the Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American approach. And its many adherents claim it is the only system that really works. Shareholder value is, for them, the acid test, all that matters. All this is despite clear evidence to the contrary from Germany, Japan, China, India and many other jurisdictions.

Much of the literature on corporate governance argues that these other approaches are in fact converging on the Anglo-American model and even assesses the level of their maturity in terms of how closely they comply with the Anglo-American line. It’s all nonsense.

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The Importance of Agency in ‘The Rise and Fall of Management’

‘The Rise and Fall of Management’ highlights some issues as of particular importance to the current situation. For instance, the universal adoption of agency theory. Agency is a legal relationship where the agent acts on behalf of the principal who is bound by the agent’s actions, and the agent is bound to act, in his or her professional capacity, in the principal’s best interests. So much is not in doubt. Moreover, early examples of this legal relationship related to the commercial world, as in the old overseas trading companies where the ship’s captain acted as the agent of the ship’s owners. That origin too is not questioned.

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Corporate Criminality and the Free Market Philosophy

A key tenet of the free market philosophy, elegantly expressed by Milton Friedman, was that businesses should focus exclusively on maximising shareholder value and not allow other considerations, apart from compliance with the law, to intrude on their business activities. That’s what Friedman stood for. And that’s what governments over the past 30 years have lived by. And that’s what still protects big business from having to pay for its own excesses. The speculative banks, the oil companies, the private equity and hedge funds, all steal from the tax payer with the total impunity provided by Friedman’s malign theory. Occasionally, there’s a coincidence of events hitting the headlines together, shouting out the criminal injustice of what is allowed to go on. Today, it’s BP’s destruction in the Gulf of Mexico, the 25 year late convictions over Union Carbide’s poisoning of Bophal residents, and the revelation of multi-billion pound additional decommissioning costs of old UK nuclear power plants. Despite BP’s disastrous poisoning from the Deepwater Horizon well, the company remains much exercised over its next multi-billion pound dividend hand out to shareholders. Friedman still rules.

As always, it’s the average Joe tax payer, who pays the real price, while the exploiters laugh all the way to their tax haven based banks. But the law, for example the 2006 Companies Act, charges company directors with the duty to care for the best long term interests of their company, having regard to the interests of all its stakeholders, not just its shareholders. In fact this has been the case since mid-nineteenth century when limited liability was first established. But Friedman’s rule has become so ubiquitous that company directors have come to believe it is their legal duty to make as much money as possible for shareholders ignoring any other social responsibility.

There will be no change in practice – and criminal pollution will continue – till that simplistic theory is dead and buried and Friedman discredited along with it. Academics might seek an alternative theory with which to replace it, but that is not necessary. Economic theories tend always to be over simplified as they apply to the real world. Rather than a new theory, all that is necessary is to impose existing law such as the Companies Act. That would require directors to act in the best long term interests of their company and all its stakeholders, which the law lists as including employees, suppliers and others specifically including the local community and the environment. Company directors who transgress, as those at BP, Union Carbide, RBS etc, etc, etc, should immediately face the full force of the law.

Protecting Real Economy Firms from Speculating Predators

A number of issues relevant to postings on these pages have been raised during the campaigning for the UK general election. For example, following Kraft’s acquisition of Cadbury, the Labour government proposes to raise the voting threshold for such deals from a simple majority to two thirds of shareholder votes and to exclude from voting any shares acquired since the bid was announced. This would at least slow down some such deals, but as the Liberal Democrats claim, would go nowhere near re-imposing a ‘public interest’ test which would give ministers the power to intervene in deals deemed to be against the public interest. Such a test was abandoned in 1992 with the support of both main parties. But public interest is a vague and inadequate hurdle for such deals, especially when likely British governments will claim the preservation of free and open markets is the prime public interest. So electrical supply company Chloride, and bus and train operator Arriva, the latest targets of foreign bidders, can expect little protection. Unlike, for example, their German counterparts, whose employee stakeholders have 50% representation on the supervisory board and would be able to provide some protection against bids which were against the long term interests of the company, as opposed to the short term interests of its shareholders. UK law requires directors should take the interests of all stakeholders into consideration, not just what the government of the day regards as the public interest.

Another issue that has caused some debate in the run up to the election is the Liberal Democrats’ proposal to again separate commercial banking from hedging and speculative activities, and to tax and regulate the latter differently from traditional banking. This would have the added benefit of breaking up some firms which are currently ‘too big to fail’. The two main parties are united in their objections to this approach, presumably for fear it would reduce London’s attractions as the world’s largest hedging base, and some might leave. However, hedge funds may find the United States even less comfortable. And most G20 nations are moving in that same direction. The days when ‘socially useless’ hedging enjoys total freedom may be numbered.

Going for Goldman

The problem with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s long overdue pursuit of the potentially fraudulent practice in Goldman Sachs is that it is likely to take a long time to conclude, will cost an arm and a leg, and its outcome is far from certain. If and when the UK authorities follow SEC’s example, it would be likely to cost more, take longer, and be even less likely to produce convictions.

The problem is that such legal actions engage with the details of credit default swops (CDSs), collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and the whole panoply of financial derivatives that have been deliberately invented to mislead and defraud. CDOs were invented so as to deliberately disguise the real extent of liabilities and so make a firm appear less risky and therefore capable of taking on more debt, which was done with the same deliberate intention to mislead and defraud. This is a minefield where the attribution of blame and intent is full of deliberately confusing and opaque detail.

It would be better to step back from the detailed machinations and simply take a view of the truth and fairness of a firm’s published accounts. It is not difficult to do with the benefit of hindsight. Where balance sheets have been seen not to reflect a true and fair account of a company’s position, the auditor who certified the balance sheet should be prosecuted. They are paid vast sums for their expertise and diligence in certifying company accounts. Auditors who are party to misleading accounts, are guilty of either incompetence or dishonesty. They should surely have to face the full force of the law and be struck off by their professional body. Similar treatment should be meted out to those who presented the misleading accounts. And those who gained through their deliberate misrepresentation and have taken large bonuses as a result, should be similarly treated, with their fraudulently earned bonuses being repaid.

This would be a major change in accepted custom and practice, but it is to be hoped the SEC’S action against Goldman Sachs is a first step in that direction.

Devastating Mistakes of Economics

In 1792, William Pitt told parliament that Adam Smith’s “extensive knowledge of detail … will …furnish the best solution to every question … of political economy.” Since then it’s been downhill all the way. For Smith, the industrial firm (his famous pin factory) was the key to economic progress, with the market only serving to enable the division of labour. But economists have always given primacy to the market, almost ignoring the industrial firm, because they don’t begin to understand it. In late nineteenth century, economists adopted differential calculus to model the economy, which meant describing the firm as a “production function” comprising two variables, price and quantity, and seeking to maximise profit. This was not just stupid, but hugely damaging. Maximising one thing requires the neglect of everything else, which has done great damage to Anglo-Saxon industry. Finally, in the 1980s, still completely unable to conceive of what a firm involves, they adopted the agency idea, claiming that the managers of a firm were the agents of its shareholders and should not therefore be maximising profit but maximising shareholder wealth. It is a lie. Managers have no contract with shareholders, but with the firm which is a legal entity in its own right. Shareholders do not own the firm – if they did they would not enjoy limited liability. They own shares which entitle them to dividends and capital growth, both at risk. Maximising shareholder wealth, as required by Friedman and followers, requires neglecting everything else. When specific decisions have to be taken, notably in the case of hostile takeovers, this is crucial. It has destroyed much of what remains of Anglo-Saxon industry, the latest British example being Cadbury. It has also justified the obscenity of top executive share option bonuses, which unless reversed will be the source of what is called euphemistically, social unrest.

Was Friedman right?

Milton Friedman is given a rather severe critique in The Rise and Fall of Management, especially over his malign influence on industrial management, how it is taught and how it is done. The Friedmanism which best captures his contribution to that endeavour is the one which tells the world that ‘corporate officials’ have no ‘social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible’.

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Rape and Pillage or Co-operation

The announcement that Gordon Brown is to put mutualism and co-operatives, such as John Lewis Partnership, at the heart of Labour’s election manifesto is surely welcome after twelve years of the rape and pillage resulting from New Labour’s unquestioning support for free market deregulation and the maximising of shareholder wealth. But what does it mean? Is it just the sentimental swan-song of the Labour government? Or does it have substance as the foundation for real action?

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The Destruction of Accumulated Surpluses

The disposal of Cadbury is some kind of a marker. It was still a successful company and could have continued independently with no problem. It had a proud history which doesn’t need to be repeated here, but it also had a price. And that price was agreed by its board of directors who gained prodigiously from the sale. Cadbury’s loss of autonomy is surely the precursor of many cost reducing decisions taken at its new American headquarters without regard to the old Cadbury stakeholders, notably including its employees. Doubtless, in the end, Cadbury’s Bournville heritage will be preserved merely as yet another industrial museum, the dead remains of the once thriving industrial community. Such relics are strewn across the British landscape, commemorating our once pioneering roles in wool, cotton and silk textiles, machine tools, iron and steel, cycles, motor cycles, motor cars, trucks and buses, china and pottery and hundreds of other sectors where Britain was successful and achieved a strong position but then sold it off for the financial gain of the few and the bitter disadvantage of the many.

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The Institutional Truth About Free Markets

The theory which, over the past three decades, has become the ubiquitous orthodox free market wisdom, is widely assumed to be simply the current version of classical economics originally expounded by Adam Smith. Moreover, it might be reasonable to assume, it being the latest, it is the most insightful and effective, having been shaped by the errors and excesses of previous versions. The current free market model certainly includes Adam Smith in its provenance, but what makes it different from previous models is the fact it is also based on certain theoretical foundations which are demonstrably false and which previous versions did not share. It has become what J K Galbraith described as an institutional truth. That is, not a truth at all, but a downright lie, but one to which all associated must subscribe if their careers are to prosper.

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